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ABSTRACT: This article centres around objectification. It offers an analysis of the 
notions that are involved in this phenomenon, their moral wrongness, as well as 
the connections that exist between them. Martha Nussbaum has suggested that 
seven notions are involved in objectification: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, 
inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity. She es-
pouses the view that the instrumentalisation of human beings (the treatment of 
human beings instrumentally to achieve our purposes) is especially problematic 
as compared to the other ways in which we can treat human beings as objects (for 
example, denying their autonomy and subjectivity, or treating them as violable). 
In this paper, I argue against the view that instrumentalisation should be thought 
of as more suspicious from a moral point of view than the rest of the ways in 
which people can be treated as objects. Singling out extreme instrumentality for 
being especially problematic might lead us to underestimate the wrongness in-
volved in the other ways of treating human beings as objects, and can therefore 
potentially distort our understanding of what, more generally, is wrong with ob-
jectifying human beings.
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Introduction
This article centres around objectification, which we can define, roughly, 
as the seeing and/or treating a person as an object. Instrumentalising peo-
ple, treating them instrumentally for our purposes, has been considered to 
be one of the most characteristic forms objectification can take.
1 I am very grateful to the two anonymous reviewers of Prolegomena for their valu-
able comments and suggestions for improving my article.
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Immanuel Kant has famously argued that when people exercise their 
sexuality outside the context of monogamous marriage they run the risk 
of being reduced to “objects of appetite”, mere tools for sexual purposes. 
Kant vividly states in the Lectures on Ethics:
…as an object of appetite, a person becomes a thing, and can be used and 
treated as such by everyone. … [he/she is] used by all and sundry as an in-
strument for the satisfaction of sexual inclination. (Kant 1963: 163, 165)
Contemporary feminists Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin are 
concerned that women in our patriarchal societies are treated by men as 
mere instruments for their purposes. Women, as MacKinnon puts it, “exist 
to the end of male pleasure” (MacKinnon 1987: 173).2 Dworkin similarly 
writes:
The whole world outside man himself is viewed as the object world… Man 
uses objects – women, children, animals, sensate beings called objects as 
a matter of course – to feel his own power and presence. … A man must 
function as the human centre of a chattel-oriented sensibility, surrounded by 
objects to be used so that he can experience his own power and pleasure.3
Kant, MacKinnon and Dworkin understand objectification in terms of 
instrumentalisation. For these thinkers, objectification is defined as the 
treatment of a person (a woman, in the case of MacKinnon and Dworkin) 
as a mere instrument for another’s purposes.
In her landmark article “Objectification” Martha Nussbaum offers a sys-
tematic analysis of objectification, and rightly argues that it is in fact a much 
more complex and multiple concept than Kant, MacKinnon and Dworkin 
took it to be (Nussbaum 1995: 251). Nussbaum claims that apart from in-
strumentality, there are six more notions involved in the phenomenon of 
objectification. Objectification, then, is not to be understood solely in terms 
of instrumentalisation.4 To objectify a person, according to Nussbaum, is to 
treat them in one or more of these seven ways: treat them as an instrument 
to achieve a further purpose, treat them in a way that denies their autonomy, 
treat them as inert, as fungible, as violable, as owned by another person, or, 
finally, treat them in a way that denies their subjectivity (ibid. 257).
Nussbaum, then, unlike Kant, MacKinnon and Dworkin, acknowl-
edges the fact that we should not conceive objectification simply in terms 
2 MacKinnon’s views on sexual objectification can also be found in her (1989), 
(1989a), (1993), (1995), (1997). 
3 Dworkin (1989: 104). For more on Dworkin’s ideas on pornography and objectifi-
cation see Dworkin  (1997) and (2000).
4 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer of Prolegomena for encouraging me 
to further emphasize this point.
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of instrumentalisation. However, Nussbaum, like the above mentioned 
thinkers, attributes instrumentality a special kind of status in her discus-
sion of the phenomenon of objectification: she claims that, of all the no-
tions involved in the idea of objectification, instrumentality is especially 
problematic. First of all, because treating people instrumentally consti-
tutes the denial of their humanity (what I call the “Kantian critique” of 
instrumentality). Secondly, because instrumentalising human beings can 
lead to other forms of objectification (what I call the “pragmatic critique”) 
(ibid. 265).
In this article, my purpose is to clarify the concept of objectifica-
tion, through an analysis of the notions involved in it and their relations 
with one another. I argue that instrumentality is not special in either of the 
above two ways as compared to the other notions involved in objectifica-
tion. I begin, in Section A, with an analysis of Nussbaum’s own concep-
tion of objectification. Section B focuses on the claim that instrumentality 
is especially problematic. The reason Nussbaum endorses this claim, as 
I explain, is because she unfairly compares treating a person as a mere 
instrument (what I call “extreme instrumentality” or “extreme instrumen-
talisation”) to the treatment of a person in one or more of the other six 
ways in moderation (for example, the occasional denial of a person’s au-
tonomy). I then proceed in the last two sections to fairer comparisons be-
tween the seven notions involved in objectification: In section C, I argue 
that all seven notions, when present in their extreme forms within certain 
contexts, constitute the denial of people’s humanity. Finally, in section D, 
I show that extreme instrumentality is not special in its capacity to lead to 
other forms of objectification.
A. Nussbaum’s conception of objectification.
Nussbaum defines objectification as “… the seeing and/or treating of 
someone as an object. … treating one thing as another: One is treating 
as an object, what is really not an object, what is, in fact, a human being” 
(ibid. 251, 256–7). She explains that seven notions are involved in the idea 
of objectification:
1. Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool for his or her 
purposes.
2. Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in au-
tonomy and self-determination.
3. Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and per-
haps also in activity.
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4. Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with 
other objects of the same type, and/or (b) with objects of other types.
5. Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary- integ-
rity, as something that it is permissible to break up, smash, break into.
6. Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something that is owned 
by another, can be bought or sold, etc.
7. Denial of subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as something 
whose experiences and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account 
(ibid. 257).
Nussbaum holds that each of the above notions is a feature of our treat-
ment of things, even though we do not treat all things in all of these ways. 
Take a ballpoint pen and a Monet painting, for example. As Nussbaum 
acknowledges, the way that the ballpoint pen is an object involves all the 
items on the list, except maybe violability. So, it seems appropriate to treat 
a pen as a tool for our purposes, to treat it as nonautonomous, as inert, as 
fungible with other pens or objects, as owned, and as not having subjectiv-
ity. Breaking the pen (treating it as violable) does not seem appropriate, 
according to her, since it can be thought as wasteful, but there is small (if 
any) moral significance to our breaking it.
Our treatment of the Monet painting, on the other hand, involves 
fewer of the items on the list. While we can treat it, like the ballpoint pen, 
as nonautonomous, owned, inert, and lacking in subjectivity, it seems in-
appropriate to treat the painting as fungible (except in the limited sense of 
being bought or sold which, Nussbaum holds, does not imply thorough-
going fungibility), to destroy it, or to treat it as a mere instrument for our 
purposes (ibid. 257, 259).
Nussbaum avoids giving a straightforward answer to the question 
whether we can treat each of these seven features as sufficient for the ob-
jectification of persons. In some cases, according to her, treating a person 
in one of the seven ways on her list can be sufficient for objectifying that 
person, whereas in other cases it cannot. Usually, however, in a case of a 
person’s objectification, more than one of these seven features is in play 
(ibid. 258).
The objectification of a human being can be, according to Nussbaum, 
either negative or benign/positive, depending on how it affects this indi-
vidual’s humanity. In her article, Nussbaum employs the Kantian notion 
of “humanity”. Following Kant, Nussbaum understands humanity as an 
individual’s rational nature and capacity for rational choice. Humanity is 
what distinguishes human beings from animals and inanimate objects. It 
gives human beings a “dignity”, an absolute value that must always be 
respected in moral choice and action, or what Nussbaum herself calls the 
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“status of being ends in themselves” (ibid. 265). As a being with humanity, 
Kant has famously argued, “every human being has a legitimate claim to 
respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every 
other” (Kant 1996: 209).
Objectification, then, is of a negative kind, according to Nussbaum, if 
the objectified individual’s humanity is denied, in the sense of not being 
properly acknowledged or respected when they are treated as an object. 
She mentions three main cases of negative objectification in her article: the 
case of Isabelle, in Hankinson’s novel Isabelle and Veronique, a woman 
who is treated as nothing more than a mere instrument for the satisfac-
tion of Macrae’s sexual desires, and who is furthermore physically abused 
by him; the case of Playboy, a magazine which presents women as mere 
things for men’s pleasure, as completely fungible objects with severely 
compromised autonomy and subjectivity; and the case of Charlotte and 
the Prince, the spouses of two rich art collectors, Adam and Maggie, in 
James’ novel The Golden Bowl. Charlotte and the Prince are treated by 
their spouses not as beings with humanity but as fine antique furniture.5
Benign/positive objectification takes place, on the other hand, if the 
objectified individual’s humanity is properly acknowledged, respected, 
and even promoted when they are treated as an object. The paradigmatic 
case of positive objectification Nussbaum discusses in her article is the 
case of Connie and Mellor, the two lovers from Lawrence’s Lady Chat-
terley’s Lover. In a context characterised by general respect for each oth-
er’s humanity, the lovers occasionally deny each other’s autonomy and 
subjectivity when having sex by attributing “a certain kind of independent 
agency to the bodily parts… both parties put aside their individuality and 
become identified with their bodily organs. They see one another in terms 
of those organs” (Nussbaum 1995: 274). Yet, Nussbaum holds, “…the 
suggestion that they are reducing one another to their bodily parts seems 
quite wrong… The intense focusing of attention on the bodily parts seems 
an addition, rather than a subtraction…” (ibid. 275). In the passage from 
Lawrence discussed by Nussbaum the two lovers deny each other’s auton-
omy and subjectivity, and treat each other instrumentally when engaging 
in the sex act. However, the two lovers overall respect, value and promote 
each other’s autonomy and subjectivity, and they generally regard each 
other as more than mere tools for their sexual purposes.
According to Nussbaum, then, the objectification of a human being 
involves seeing and/or treating them as an object, in one or more of the 
seven ways she mentions on her list: seeing/and or treating them as an 
instrument, denying their autonomy, seeing and/or treating them as inert, 
5 These examples will be examined in more detail in section C.
10 Prolegomena 11 (1) 2012
as fungible, as violable, as owned, denying them subjectivity. Objectifica-
tion is of a negative kind if the objectified individual’s humanity is not 
fully acknowledged or respected when they are seen and/or treated as an 
object; and it is of a benign sort if the objectified individual’s humanity is 
properly acknowledged, respected, and even promoted when they are seen 
and/or treated as an object.
B. The special wrongness of instrumentalising human beings.
“Instrumentality” is the first notion on Nussbaum’s list. She defines it as 
the treatment of a person as a tool for [another’s] purposes (ibid. 257). 
However, throughout her article Nussbaum uses the terms “instrumental-
ity” and “instrumentalisation” to refer both to the treatment of a person as 
a tool and to the treatment of a person as a mere tool for someone else’s 
purposes, even though she seems aware that these two sorts of treatment 
are distinct.6 This often leads to confusion, as the reader is left to guess 
when “instrumentality” is used to refer to the treatment of a person as an 
instrument, and when it is used to refer to the treatment of a person as a 
mere instrument. Sometimes, the overall context in which objectification 
takes place can help us understand whether the objectified individual is 
treated as a tool or as a mere tool. Unfortunately, however, the overall 
context of objectification does not always reveal this.
It is crucial, then, to draw a distinction here between these two sorts 
of treatment. First of all, a person can be treated as an instrument or a tool 
for the achievement of some further purpose. From now on, I will be refer-
ring to this treatment as “instrumentality” or “instrumentalisation”. Sec-
ondly, a person can be treated as a mere instrument or a mere tool for the 
achievement of some purpose. I will be referring to this latter treatment as 
“extreme instrumentality” or “extreme instrumentalisation”.
Treating a person as an instrument to achieve some purpose need not 
be inconsistent with respecting her humanity, and with treating her as an 
6 To be more precise, Nussbaum uses the terms “instrumentality” and “instrumentali-
sation” to refer, on the one hand, to the treatment of a person as a tool, and, on the other 
hand, to the treatment of a person as a mere tool or primarily as a tool. However, in her 
article Nussbaum does not deal further with the distinction between treating a person as a 
mere instrument and treating her primarily as an instrument. Even though these two sorts 
of treatment seem to be distinct (there is an absoluteness to the former that there is not to 
the latter), what is important, for Nussbaum, is that treating an individual in both these 
ways, as we will see later on, constitutes the denial of her humanity. For the purposes of 
this paper, I will not, like Nussbaum, be concerned with this distinction.  The cases that I 
will discuss will mostly be ones in which people are treated as mere instruments. The con-
clusions that I will draw concerning this kind of treatment and the way it affects humanity, 
however, can also be extended to the treatment of people primarily as instruments.
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end in herself. We do in fact treat others, as well as ourselves, as instru-
ments in various ways in our everyday lives (for instance, we use friends 
as means for company, teachers as means for learning, and we also use 
ourselves as means to prepare a meal, to clean the house, to reach a desti-
nation). It would be absurd to say that all such instrumentalisation is mor-
ally problematic, and inconsistent with respect for humanity. Kant himself 
writes: “so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person, or in 
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely 
as a means” (Kant 1998: 138). There is no prohibition in Kant’s Categori-
cal Imperative against treating each other as instruments or means. The 
prohibition is, rather, against treating each other merely as means. What 
should worry us, then, is extreme instrumentalisation: the treatment of 
people as mere instruments or means. Treating people in this way is, for 
Kant, inconsistent with respecting their humanity, their rational nature and 
capacities; it is inconsistent with treating them as ends in themselves.
Nussbaum in fact agrees with the view that what should concern us is 
extreme instrumentalisation, whereas cases in which people are treated as 
means (but not as mere means) need not be thought of as problematic from 
a moral point of view. She makes this clear in the following passage:
Notice, however, that instrumentalisation does not seem to be problematic in 
all contexts. If I am lying around with my lover on the bed, and use his stom-
ach as a pillow there seems to be nothing at all baneful about this, provided 
that I do so with his consent (or, if he is asleep, with a reasonable belief that 
he would not mind), and without causing him pain, provided as well, that 
I do so in the context of a relationship in which he is generally treated as 
more than a pillow. This suggests that what is problematic is not instrumen-
talisation per se, but treating someone primarily or merely as an instrument. 
(Nussbaum 1995: 265)
The above example shows that there is nothing morally problematic, for 
Nussbaum, in treating a person as an instrument. It is alright to use my 
partner instrumentally as a pillow, so long as I generally treat him as more 
than a thing: as a being with humanity.
Nussbaum, then, proceeds to a strong statement about the special 
wrongness involved in “instrumentalising human beings” (ibid.). She writes:
…there is something especially problematic about instrumentalising human 
beings, something that involves denying what is fundamental to them as hu-
man beings, namely, the status of being ends in themselves. From this one 
denial, other forms of objectification that are not logically entailed by the 
first seem to follow. (ibid.)
… the instrumental treatment of human beings… is always morally prob-
lematic. … It is closely bound up with other forms of objectification… On 
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the other hand, there seems to be no other item on the list that is always 
morally objectionable. Denial of autonomy and denial of subjectivity are 
objectionable if they persist throughout an adult relationship, but as phases 
in a relationship… they can be all right, or even quite wonderful… (ibid. 
289–90)
Nussbaum wants to draw our attention, here, to the instrumental treat-
ment of human beings. The terms “instrumentalising” and “instrumental 
treatment” are used by her in these passages to refer to extreme instrumen-
talisation. As the above example of the person who is treated as a pillow 
suggests, instrumentalisation, for Nussbaum, is not per se problematic, 
and so not all kinds of treating a person as an instrument are taken by her 
to be morally worrisome. We have reason, then, to read her claim about 
the special wrongness of instrumentalising human beings as specifically 
referring to extreme instrumentalisation: not to the treatment of people as 
means but, rather, to their treatment merely as means.
There is something especially worrisome, then, with extreme in-
strumentalisation, according to Nussbaum, as compared to the other six 
notions on her list. She seems to locate two ways in which extreme instru-
mentalisation is especially problematic. First of all, she offers what I will 
call a “Kantian critique” of extreme instrumentalisation: when a person is 
treated as a mere instrument for another’s purposes, her status of being an 
end in herself, her humanity, is denied or disrespected. Secondly, Nuss-
baum offers a “pragmatic critique” of extreme instrumentalisation: it is 
especially problematic, she suggests, because it can lead to other forms of 
objectification. Extreme instrumentalisation, then, according to this sec-
ond critique, has especially bad consequences.
Nussbaum’s two critiques, the Kantian and the pragmatic, are to the 
point. Extreme instrumentalisation does involve the denial of an individu-
al’s humanity: when an individual is treated as a nothing more than a tool, 
his humanity is certainly not properly acknowledged and respected. Fur-
thermore, extreme instrumentalisation can indeed lead to other forms of 
objectification, as we will see later on.
Nussbaum’s comparison, however, is an unfair one. She compares ex-
treme instrumentalisation, the treatment of a person as nothing more than 
an instrument, with the other notions on her list occurring only in mod-
eration (or as Nussbaum puts it “as phases”) in a relationship (ibid. 290). 
That is, she compares cases such as the one of Macrae who treats Isabelle 
as nothing more than a tool for the satisfaction of his sadistic desires, or 
the case of Playboy consumers who see and treat women as mere sexual 
instruments, with cases where there is only occasional and non-persist-
ent denial of people’s autonomy and subjectivity. One such case is, for 
instance, the case of the two lovers in Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley: Con-
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nie and Mellor occasionally deny each other’s autonomy and subjectiv-
ity when having sex, while generally respecting and valuing each other’s 
autonomy and subjectivity.
Not surprisingly, Nussbaum concludes that what the Lawrentian 
lovers do is “alright, or even quite wonderful”, while what Macrae and 
the pornography consumers do is morally problematic (ibid.). Certainly, 
treating a person as nothing more than an instrument is worse than, say, 
denying this person’s autonomy and subjectivity a few times, within the 
context of a relationship where their autonomy and subjectivity are overall 
respected. However, it does not seem right to compare extreme instrumen-
talisation (the treatment of a person as nothing more than an instrument) 
with the treatment of a person in the other ways on Nussbaum’s list in 
moderation.
What conclusions can we draw attempting a fairer comparison? The 
question we need to answer is the following: Is extreme instrumentalisa-
tion worse – in constituting the denial of an individual’s humanity, her 
status of being an end in herself, and, furthermore, in its capacity to lead to 
other forms of objectification – as compared to the other notions on Nuss-
baum’s list when present, not in moderation, but in more extreme forms?
C. Is extreme instrumentalisation special in Kantian terms?
Let us, first of all, see if Nussbaum is right to think that extreme instru-
mentalisation is more problematic in Kantian terms, that is, in constituting 
the denial of people’s humanity, disrespecting their status as agents with 
dignity (the status of being ends in themselves). In what follows, I will fo-
cus on Nussbaum’s examples of negative objectification, in order to show 
that the occurrence of extreme instrumentalisation within a context is no 
more problematic in Kantian terms than the occurrence of the other six 
notions in their extreme forms.
1. Isabelle and Veronique (Hankinson 1989: 2–4): The first example 
of negative objectification Nussbaum discusses in her article is Hankin-
son’s passage, in which the heroine, Isabelle, is raped and physically hurt 
by a man (Macrae), and she is furthermore presented as enjoying this sort 
of treatment. Violability is present in its extreme within this example: Mac-
rae treats Isabelle as something that is permissible to violate and abuse in 
any way he wishes. Moreover, as Nussbaum also notes, in this passage 
Isabelle is treated as a mere instrument for the gratification of male desire. 
She is there just to be used as a sex object (Nussbaum 1995: 281).
Furthermore, Isabelle’s autonomy is completely denied: Macrae 
treats Isabelle as completely lacking in autonomy and self-determination. 
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He controls Isabelle’s conduct in every way and dictates how she will 
behave. Moreover, Macrae completely denies Isabelle’s subjectivity: he 
treats Isabelle as something whose experiences (feelings and thoughts) 
need not be taken into consideration at all. Macrae is completely indiffer-
ent about how Isabelle is feeling or thinking. Also, in Hankinson’s novel 
Isabelle is presented as completely inert: as lacking in agency and activity. 
She is a passive creature used for the satisfaction of Macrae’s desires (ibid. 
279–83).
2. Playboy:7 The second case of negative objectification Nussbaum 
discusses in her article is taken from Playboy.
Three pictures of actress Nicollette Sheridan playing at the Chris Evert Pro-
Celebrity Tennis Classic, her skirt hiked up to reveal her black underpants. 
Caption: “Why We Love Tennis.” (ibid. 253)
According to Nussbaum, the message given by the picture and caption is 
“whatever else this woman is and does, for us she is an object of sexual en-
joyment” (ibid. 283). In this example of negative objectification extreme 
instrumentalisation is again present. Sheridan is treated by the male read-
ers of the magazine as a mere means for the satisfaction of their desires; 
for them, she is a mere sexual tool. But Sheridan and the rest of the women 
in pornographic magazines are not the only objectified victims, Nussbaum 
notes. Playboy encourages its readers to objectify real-life women. So, the 
male consumers of Playboy, according to Nussbaum, can come to regard 
women in general as mere sexual instruments.8
Furthermore, Nussbaum holds, Playboy can make its consumers re-
gard women (again, both the women in the magazine and real-life women) 
as completely fungible. Playboy, however, does not, Nussbaum thinks, 
pass the message to its readers that women should be treated as violable. 
She writes: “… as part of the Playboy ‘philosophy’, women are depicted 
as beings made for sexual pleasure, rather than for the infliction of pain…” 
(ibid. 283).
Moreover, Nussbaum believes that the consumers of Playboy learn 
to recognise minimally women’s autonomy and subjectivity, but for the 
wrong reasons: the possession and consumption of women who are au-
7 A series of pictures from Playboy, April 1995.
8 Ibid. 284. In this article, I take Nussbaum’s position that men’s use of pornography 
constitutes a negative form of objectification, and encourages them to objectify real-life 
women for granted. This, however, is a view that can and has been challenged by many 
thinkers. Not all consumers of pornography will necessarily objectify real women. It is 
possible, one might think, that (at least some) men can consume pornography, but refrain 
from regarding women as objects in real life. I would like to thank the anonymous referees 
of Prolegomena for urging me to highlight this point.
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tonomous subjects (rather than things) makes men feel more powerful and 
adds to their status in the male world. Nussbaum explains: “it is sexier to 
use a human being as a thing than simply to have a thing, since it manifests 
greater control, it shows that one can control what is of such a nature as to 
elude control” (ibid. 285).
3. The Golden Bowl (James 1985: 574): The last case of negative 
objectification discussed by Nussbaum, and the one she characterises as 
the “most sinister” of all, is objectification in the passage of James’ The 
Golden Bowl (Nussbaum 1995: 288). Adam and Maggie, two art collec-
tors, treat their respective spouses, Charlotte and the Prince, as fine an-
tique furniture. This example of objectification involves all notions on 
Nussbaum’s list in their extreme forms, except physical violability. First 
of all, according to Nussbaum, this case “clearly depicts a morally blame-
worthy instrumentalisation of persons… a way of denying their human 
status and asserting the right to the permanent use of those splendidly 
elegant bodies” (ibid.). Nussbaum holds that Charlotte and the Prince are 
treated as mere means for their spouses’ ends.
Furthermore, their subjectivity is completely denied: as antique fur-
niture, the spouses are regarded as not having any thoughts or feelings at 
all. The spouses are also completely denied autonomy: they are regarded 
as not having any autonomy whatsoever. Also, they are treated as inert: 
Maggie and Adam regard them as completely lacking in agency and ac-
tivity. Moreover, Maggie and Adam regard their spouses as fungible with 
other art objects. Finally, as antique furniture, Charlotte and the Prince are 
treated as owned by their spouses. Nussbaum points out that there is no 
physical violability in this case: as fine aesthetic objects, the objectified 
spouses’ physical integrity is of great importance to Maggie and Adam, 
and so the latter certainly do not treat them as things to break and de-
stroy.
In the example from Isabelle and Veronique five out of the seven 
notions on Nussbaum’s list are present in their extremes: instrumentalisa-
tion, autonomy-denial, subjectivity-denial, violability, and inertness. The 
case of Playboy involves two of the notions in their extremes: instrumen-
talisation and fungibility. And, finally, the passage from The Golden Bowl 
involves all items on the list in their extreme forms, except physical vio-
lability.
Do we have any reasons for thinking that the presence of extreme 
instrumentalisation in the above examples is more problematic than the 
presence of the other notions in their extremes in constituting the denial 
of the objectified individual’s humanity? As I will suggest, when in their 
extremes, all seven notions should be regarded as problematic in Kantian 
terms.
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In the example from Hankinson, the treatment of Isabelle as a mere 
means for Macrae’s purposes does involve the denial of her humanity. 
That is, in treating her as nothing more than an instrument, Macrae does 
not respect Isabelle’s humanity; he does not respect her status of being 
an end in herself. However, Isabelle’s treatment as utterly violable also 
involves the denial of her humanity. Treating her as something that can 
be hurt and violated is inconsistent with respecting Isabelle’s dignity as 
a human being. So, both the fact that Isabelle is treated as something that 
is permissible to violate and the fact that she is treated as a mere tool 
involve denying her humanity, her status of being an end in herself. Fur-
thermore, the treatment of Isabelle as completely inert involves denying 
her humanity. A person’s humanity, her rational nature, cannot be fully 
acknowledged, unless she is recognised as an agent capable of acting. In 
the passage in question, Isabelle is seen and treated as completely lacking 
in agency and activity. As a result, her humanity is completely ignored. 
Macrae, then, in treating Isabelle as inert, denies her humanity.
Moving on to the Playboy example, unquestionably, the treatment of 
women in pornography (and women more generally) as mere tools for 
men’s sexual pleasure involves the denial of their humanity. The men who 
regard women as mere sexual instruments do not see and treat women 
as beings with rational nature and capacities; they merely see and treat 
them as instruments to satisfy their sexual desires. In this sense, men com-
pletely disrespect women’s humanity. However, the treatment of a woman 
as completely interchangeable with other women or objects does not ap-
pear to be better in Kantian terms: treating an individual as something that 
can easily be replaced by something or someone else is inconsistent with 
respecting their humanity. A being with humanity has an absolute value (a 
dignity), which means that it should not be treated as substitutable with 
other people or, even worse, with other things. Treating an individual as 
something that can be replaced by someone or something else is treating 
her as something that only has relative value.9
9 Kant’s point here is that treating human beings as interchangeable involves disre-
specting their absolute value, their dignity, and regarding them as beings with only con-
tingent value. In the case of pornography a porn model can be substituted by another 
porn model, or some other object that can satisfy a man’s sexual desire. This is taken to 
constitute an insult on the woman’s absolute value as a human being. The man does not 
care about the woman as a person, but only as thing for his pleasure which can, if need be, 
easily be substituted by someone or something else. There are cases, however, where sub-
stitutability strikes us as morally benign. When I go to the post office, I see the employees 
there as completely substitutable. Either one of them can help me accomplish my job, and 
this is all I care about. There seems to be nothing morally problematic with my regarding 
them as substitutable in this way. That the pornography case has been taken by a number 
of thinkers to be morally worrisome, as opposed to the post office case, has to do with the 
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The treatment of a person as something that can easily be substituted 
by another person or thing, then, involves denying her humanity. So, ex-
treme instrumentality appears to be no worse than fungibility in its ex-
treme with respect to constituting the denial of a person’s humanity. There 
is no reason, again, in this case to think that extreme instrumentalisation is 
worse in Kantian terms than fungibility in its extreme form.
In the case from The Golden Bowl, extreme instrumentalisation ap-
pears to be no worse in Kantian terms than autonomy-denial and subjec-
tivity-denial in their extreme forms. The treatment of the two spouses as 
completely nonautonomous seems to be just as problematic with respect 
to denying their status of being ends in themselves as their treatment as 
mere means for their partners’ purposes. When a person is treated as not 
having any autonomy whatsoever (as it is the case with Charlotte and 
the Prince, in The Golden Bowl), his or her humanity is clearly denied. It 
is not possible to properly acknowledge a person’s humanity, a person’s 
rational nature and capacities, while not treating them as autonomous be-
ings. The same holds for subjectivity-denial in its extreme form. The treat-
ment of Charlotte and the Prince as completely lacking in subjectivity (as 
having no feelings or thoughts whatsoever) is no better in Kantian terms 
than their treatment as mere tools. A person’s humanity cannot be properly 
acknowledged, when they are treated as nothing more than beautiful ob-
jects, as beings which have no thoughts or feelings at all.
Finally, do we have any reason for thinking that extreme instru-
mentalisation is worse in terms of denying a person’s humanity than the 
treatment of a person as a mere property, as owned by someone else? 
The answer seems to be negative. Treating a person as one’s property (as 
something that can be bought or sold), like treating him as a mere tool for 
one’s purposes, is inconsistent with respecting this person’s dignity as a 
human being, and so it constitutes the denial of his humanity. Charlotte 
and the Prince are treated as things that are owned by Maggie and Adam. 
There seems to be no reason to think that their being treated as their part-
ners’ property is less problematic in terms of denying their humanity than 
their being treated as mere instruments for their partners’ purposes.
view, stemming from Kant, that there is something special when it comes to sexuality and 
its exercise that rules interchangeability out. Kant himself thought that sexuality should 
be limited only within the context of monogamous marriage in order for it to be mor-
ally unproblematic (Kant 1963: 162–71; Kant 1996: 61–64). Of course, one might argue 
against such a view, we have no reason to regard the sexual case and the post office case 
as different.  That is, treating human beings as interchangeable in both these cases is to be 
considered as a morally benign attitude. I would like to thank the anonymous referee of 
Prolegomena for raising this important point.
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Extreme instrumentalisation, then, does not appear to be especially 
problematic in Kantian terms: it is not special, as compared to the other six 
notions in their extremes in constituting the denial of an individual’s status 
of being an end in herself. Treating people as completely nonautonomous 
involves an incorrect attitude towards their humanity. Furthermore, the 
humanity of an individual who is treated as completely fungible is denied. 
Completely denying a person’s subjectivity also does not leave any room 
for respecting their status as Kantian agents. Moreover, treating a person 
as violable also constitutes the denial of their humanity. And so is treating 
them as completely lacking in agency and activity (as inert), or as a mere 
property of another person (as owned by another). It can be concluded, 
then, that treating people in any of the seven ways on Nussbaum’s list in 
its extreme form constitutes the denial of their humanity; it is inconsist-
ent with respecting their dignity, their status of being ends in themselves. 
Nussbaum is certainly right to believe that treating a person as a mere 
instrument is inconsistent with respecting their humanity. There seems to 
be no reason, however, to single out extreme instrumentalisation for being 
especially problematic in Kantian terms.
D. Is extreme instrumentalisation special in pragmatic terms?
In the previous section I argued that all seven notions in their extreme 
forms are problematic in Kantian terms. Treating people in any of these 
seven ways constitutes the denial of their status of being ends in them-
selves: the denial of their humanity. At this point, we need to examine 
whether Nussbaum is right to believe that extreme instrumentalisation is 
especially problematic in pragmatic terms, that is, in its capacity to lead 
to other forms of objectification. In this section I explain that Nussbaum is 
right to believe that extreme instrumentalisation can lead to other forms of 
objectification. However, I argue that this is not a special characteristic of 
extreme instrumentalisation. Focusing specifically on autonomy-denial in 
its extreme form, I show that this notion, like extreme instrumentality, can 
also lead to other forms of objectification.10
1. Let us start with extreme instrumentalisation, the treatment of a 
person as a mere means for the achievement of some further end, and ex-
amine some of the connections that exist between this notion and the other 
notions on Nussbaum’s list.
10 My examination of the connections that exist between the notions involved in ob-
jectification is done through focusing specifically on the treatment of adult human beings 
in the seven ways Nussbaum mentions. As Nussbaum also acknowledges (1995: 261–2), 
denial of autonomy in the case of children is not something that we consider problematic 
from a moral point of view, and there does not seem to exist any obvious link between 
denying a child’s autonomy and treating her in more object-like ways.
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First of all, there seems to be a connection between extreme instru-
mentalisation and autonomy-denial. Treating a person as a mere tool for 
one’s purposes might lead one to deny this person’s autonomy. Mere tools 
are not standardly regarded as having any autonomy or self-determination 
whatsoever. For example, a slave master, who treats his slave as a mere 
tool for his purposes, can also be led to deny the slave’s autonomy; to treat 
the slave as lacking in self-determination, as someone to only take orders 
from him.
However, it is possible to imagine a case in which one’s using a person 
as a mere instrument does not lead one to deny their autonomy, at least not 
completely. Imagine a “kind” slave master. The kind master, even though 
he treats his slave as a mere tool for his purposes, might nonetheless not 
wish to completely deny the slave’s autonomy. That is, the master might 
not end up treating his slave as someone who completely lacks autonomy 
and self-determination. He might allow the slave to act autonomously, 
at least in some cases. Extreme instrumentalisation, then, can lead to au-
tonomy-denial, even though there is not a necessary connection between 
these two notions.
Can extreme instrumentalisation lead to inertness? Treating a person 
as a mere instrument for one’s purposes will not necessarily lead to the 
treatment of this person as inert, as lacking in agency and activity. For ex-
ample, even though a slave is treated as a mere means for someone else’s 
purposes, he is nonetheless not treated as inert: quite the opposite, he is re-
quired to be an active agent in order to perform certain tasks.11 However, 
treating someone as a mere instrument can possibly lead to the treatment 
of this individual as inert. It all depends on how one wishes to use the 
other instrumentally. As a mere instrument for somebody else’s purposes, 
an individual may be required by its user to be inert. An artist using a 
person merely as a model for drawing a painting might treat the person 
in question as inert: as lacking in agency and activity. For instance, Yves 
Klein used the models for some of his anthropometries as completely inert 
“living paint brushes”, bathing them in paint and dragging them across the 
canvases.12 We can conclude from the above that extreme instrumentalisa-
tion can in some cases lead to inertness.
Can extreme instrumentalisation lead to fungibility? Treating a person 
as a mere means will not necessarily lead to the treatment of this person as 
11 Although, as the referee of Prolegomena rightly points out, energy and active 
agency is limited to the tasks that we want the slave to perform and, therefore, in some 
deeper sense, it seems that we want the slave to be inert.
12 Retrieved August 2011 from: http://www.yveskleinarchives.org/works/works1_fr. 
html
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interchangeable with other people or things. A person can be treated as a 
mere tool, yet he might be irreplaceable. One can use a cook as a mere in-
strument, but find his cooking so unique that she has no desire whatsoever 
to substitute him with another.13 In some cases, however, treating a person 
as a mere instrument can lead to his treatment as fungible. One may well 
treat the person who mows her lawn as substitutable with another person 
who can perform the same task. Extreme instrumentalisation, then, can 
lead to fungibility, even though there is not a necessary connection be-
tween the two notions.
Extreme instrumentalisation can, furthermore, lead to violability, 
even though the two notions are, again, not necessarily linked. A man 
using a woman as a mere means to satisfy his sexual desire will not neces-
sarily treat her as violable. In other words, the man in question may regard 
the woman as nothing more than a sexual tool for his purposes, yet not as 
something that is permissible to violate and abuse in any way. Catharine 
MacKinnon, however, is worried that the treatment of women as mere 
sexual tools can open the path for violability and abuse. MacKinnon has 
illustrated this worry by drawing an analogy between women and cups. 
Pornography, according to her, makes it the case that women become like 
cups (mere objects for use, mere tools). Once women have acquired the 
status of objects for men’s use, then violence and abuse can easily follow 
(MacKinnon 1987: 138).
Can extreme instrumentalisation lead to subjectivity-denial? There 
seems to be a close connection between these two notions, yet not a nec-
essary one. Usually, it is the case that treating a person as a mere tool for 
another’s purposes will lead to her denial of subjectivity. Mere tools are 
not usually regarded as having any feelings or thoughts, so the person who 
is treated as a mere instrument by someone else might be denied subjec-
tivity. That is, one who regards a person as a mere tool for his purposes is 
likely to also regard her as not having any feelings or thoughts at all or, 
at least, as someone whose feelings and thoughts need not be taken into 
consideration.
However, as Nussbaum also acknowledges, extreme instrumentality 
does not necessarily lead to subjectivity-denial, since someone’s purpose 
of using an adult human being as a mere tool may in fact require some 
concern for their experiences. For example, male consumers of pornogra-
phy, Nussbaum says, even though they might be led to use women as mere 
sexual tools, do in fact attribute a limited amount of subjectivity to those 
13 The person in question could, of course, substitute the cook were she to find an-
other whose cooking she considered superior, as the reviewer of Prolegomena rightly 
pointed out. My point, however, is to show that this is not necessary.  
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women. Their purpose of using them as mere tools does require those 
women having some feelings and thoughts: they want the women in ques-
tion to like or dislike certain treatments, rather than having no subjectivity 
whatsoever (Nussbaum 1995: 260, 283–6). So, it can be concluded that 
extreme instrumentalisation can in some cases lead to subjectivity-denial, 
although there is not a necessary connection between these two notions.
To summarise, the treatment of a person as a mere instrument can 
lead to the treatment of this person in more object-like ways. Extreme 
instrumentalisation, however, does not necessarily lead to other forms of 
objectification.
2. Let us now proceed to autonomy-denial in its extreme form, com-
pletely denying a person’s autonomy within a certain context, and ex-
amine some of the connections between this notion and other notions on 
Nussbaum’s list.
Can autonomy-denial in its extreme form lead to the treatment of a 
person as an instrument? It seems that autonomy-denial in its extreme 
can lead to instrumentality. If one completely denies another’s autonomy, 
directing their conduct and behaviour in every respect, one might come to 
treat the other person as tool (or even as a mere tool) for their purposes. If 
one regards another as a nonautonomous being, a being that completely 
lacks self-determination, there is not much that can stop them from treat-
ing the person in question instrumentally to achieve their purposes, if they 
so desire.
However, there does not seem to exist a necessary connection be-
tween autonomy-denial in its extreme and instrumentalisation: there can 
be a case in which a person is completely denied autonomy and yet they 
are not treated instrumentally for another’s purposes. An overprotective 
person, for example, may completely deny her friend’s autonomy, without 
any intention of using the friend instrumentally, but simply because she 
is concerned about his safety. So, it can be concluded that, even though in 
some cases denying a person’s autonomy can lead to this person’s instru-
mentalisation, the connection between autonomy-denial in its extreme and 
instrumentality is not a necessary one.
Furthermore, there seems to be a close connection between extreme 
autonomy-denial and subjectivity-denial when it comes to adult human 
beings, even though it would be safer again to say that the connection 
between the two is not a necessary one. In some cases, when a person is 
completely denied autonomy, she is treated either as not having any feel-
ings and thoughts at all, or as if her feelings and thoughts should not be 
taken into consideration. A man who treats his female partner as lacking in 
autonomy and self-determination is very likely to also ignore her feelings 
and thoughts (her subjectivity).
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However, we can imagine a case in which there is complete auton-
omy-denial without subjectivity-denial. Many feminists have talked, for 
example, about women’s internalisation of their own submissive status: 
some women have come to believe that this is the way things should be, 
and have accepted their submissiveness as something inevitable, even 
natural. So, we can imagine a woman who is treated as completely no-
nautonomous by a man and yet, since her feelings and thoughts about 
her submissive situation coincide with the man’s, they are in a sense not 
ignored. In this case, denial of autonomy does not lead to denial of sub-
jectivity, so we can conclude that the former does not necessarily lead to 
the latter.
I have explained in this section that autonomy-denial in its extreme 
form can, like extreme instrumentalisation, lead to other forms of objec-
tification. Both these notions can lead, even though not necessarily, to the 
treatment of people in more object-like ways.14 Nussbaum, then, is wrong 
to believe that extreme instrumentalisation is special in leading to other 
forms of objectification. That is, extreme instrumentalisation, unlike what 
Nussbaum thinks, is not special in pragmatic terms.
Conclusion
In this article, I have examined the seven notions involved in objectifica-
tion and argued against the view that there is special wrongness involved 
in instrumentalising human beings, treating human beings as mere means 
for the achievement of further ends. All seven features involved in objecti-
fication, when present in their extremes, are problematic in Kantian terms: 
they are inconsistent with proper regard for humanity. Treating people in 
one or more of these seven ways constitutes a negative form of objectifi-
cation, since it fails to respect their dignity as human beings. Furthermore, 
since all seven notions in their extremes constitute the denial of people’s 
humanity, they can potentially open the path for treating people in more 
object-like ways. This means that extreme instrumentality is not special 
14 In this paper, I have specifically focused on autonomy-denial in its extreme form 
and how it can lead to other forms of objectification, in order to show that Nussbaum is 
wrong to claim that extreme instrumentality is special in pragmatic terms. This is not to say, 
however, that the rest of the notions on Nussbaum’s list cannot similarly lead to other forms 
of objectification. Take ownership, for example: for women in many parts of the world, and 
for modern day slaves in Mauritania the fundamental problem would seem to be that they, 
by law and custom, actually are property of another and can be treated instrumentally and 
denied autonomy as a result. In this case, ownership leads to the instrumental treatment 
of the people in question. This example too shows that Nussbaum is wrong to think that 
instrumentality is special in its capacity to lead to other forms of objectification.
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in its capacity to lead to other forms of objectification: it is not special 
in pragmatic terms. Treating people merely as means for our purposes is 
undoubtedly problematic from a moral point of view. There is no obvious 
reason, however, to think that it is more problematic than, for example, 
completely denying people’s autonomy or subjectivity, treating them as 
completely inert, fungible, or violable beings. Singling out extreme instru-
mentality for being especially problematic might lead us to underestimate 
the wrongness involved in the other ways of treating human beings as 
objects, and can therefore potentially distort our understanding of what, 
more generally, is wrong with objectifying human beings.
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